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DAMAGES: A CATALYST FOR JURISDICTIONAL
DISPUTES IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS
ROBERT F. HUNGERFORD*
RUPERT M. SHORE**
AVIATION ACCIDENTS that occur in Canada often raise in-
I eresting jurisdictional disputes involving potentially enor-
mous financial ramifications for the parties affected by the
accident. From our experience, courts in both Canada and the
United States appear content to assume jurisdiction over a case
even when the link between the litigants and the jurisdiction is
slight. The convenience of the parties involved is, to a large ex-
tent, irrelevant to this issue. Frequently, the injured party's deci-
sion as to where to commence a lawsuit is governed by the size
of potential damages that might be awarded in a particular juris-
diction. In this Article, the authors attempt to address why a
Canadian plaintiff might, whenever possible, choose to seek re-
dress in the courts of the United States rather than the courts of
Canada.
Let us consider a typical fact pattern arising from an aviation
accident causing personal injuries. A resident of one Canadian
province is injured in an accident occurring in a jurisdiction in
which he is not a resident. The resident alleges that mainte-
nance performed or products manufactured in any number of
American jurisdictions (by companies residing in numerous ju-
risdictions) caused the accident. That is to say, allegations of
negligence or products liability may link the aviation accident in
Canada to several states in the United States. In these circum-
stances, the initial decision to be made by the injured party gen-
erally concerns the jurisdiction in which to commence the
lawsuit and the law to be applied in the action.1 Most impor-
* Robert F. Hungerford is a litigation partner of the Canadian law firm of
Campney & Murphy.
** Rupert M. Shore is a litigation associate of Campney & Murphy.
I We have been consulted by American counsel on several of these cases to
advise on the laws of Canada.
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tantly, as will be discussed in this Article, damages in American
courts are substantially higher. Generally, therefore, plaintiffs
want their cases to be heard in the United States while defend-
ants want these cases heard in Canada.
There are procedural differences between actions tried in
these two countries. In addition to a difference in damages, for
example, in Canada there is no constitutionally enshrined right
to a trial by jury, such as exists in the United States. The vast
majority of products liability-related trials in Canada proceed
before a judge alone. Under many of the jurisdictions in Can-
ada, each party has a right to attempt to try the matter before a
jury. At the same time, the opposing party has the right to apply
to the court to have the trial by jury set aside. Under the British
Columbia Supreme Court Rules, Rule 39(27) (a), (b), the court
has the power to strike out ajury notice:
(a) within 7 days for an order that the trial or part of it be
heard by the court without a jury on the ground that
(i) the issues require prolonged examination of documents
or accounts or a scientific or local investigation which can-
not be made conveniently with a jury, or
(ii) the issues are of an intricate or complex character, or
(b) at any time for an order that the trial be heard by the
court without a jury on the ground that it relates to one of the
matters referred to in subrule (25).2
British Columbian courts commonly strike out a jury notice
where there is a complex products liability claim. The courts
reason that complex products liability trials are often lengthy,
with complex technical evidence and vast quantities of
documents.
Another significant difference in products liability trials in
Canada is that strict liability is not applied to manufacturers in
products liability cases. In order for a plaintiff to succeed, the
court must find that there was negligence on the part of the
manufacturer. When the concept of "no strict liability" is com-
bined with a judge hearing the evidence without ajury and with
the nature of the evidence in products liability trials, it is more
difficult for a plaintiff to succeed in Canada than in the United
States where the concept of strict liability and jury trials exist.
However, at the heart of most battles between plaintiffs and
defendants as to the proper forum or law to be applied in such
cases is the availability of, or limits upon, the various types of
2 B.C. Sup. Ct. R. 39 (27)(a)(b) (Can.).
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damages available to plaintiffs in different jurisdictions. In the
United States, plaintiffs (and their attorneys) can realistically
conceive of jury awards which would exceed, literally, by mil-
lions of dollars that which might follow from litigating an identi-
cal action in Canada. These differences in quantum arise, to a
large extent, from differing approaches to calculating non-pecu-
niary damages and punitive damages.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a description of the
Canadian approach to damage awards, which can be used by
American readers as a comparison to their system. We have
pointed to some of the American jurisprudence, but have not
attempted in any way to be comprehensive in our review of the
American authorities. It is our opinion that the differences in
damage awards can be explained by contrasting the rationale
applied to damage awards by courts in the two countries.
I. NON-PECUNIARY LOSS
A. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
Canada is made up of ten provinces and two northern territo-
ries. Each of these jurisdictions has a trial court upon which
federally appointed judges sit. In addition, each jurisdiction has
a court of appeal, once again composed of federally appointed
judges, to which litigants dissatisfied with trial judgments have a
right of appeal. The laws in the various provinces and territories
of Canada do not vary substantially. The differences are not con-
sidered significant for the purposes of this Article.
Above the twelve courts of appeal is the Supreme Court of
Canada. In civil matters, there is no absolute right of appeal to
this Court. A litigant must persuade a panel of three justices of
the Supreme Court that it should be entitled to "leave" to ap-
peal. In order to obtain leave a litigant must persuade the Court
that the issue of law upon which the court of appeal is alleged to
have erred is one of public importance or is of such nature or
significance as to warrant decision by it.3 Judgments of the
Supreme Court of Canada are binding in all courts in Canada.
A judicial cap on damages for non-pecuniary damages in in-
jury cases has been established by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada.4 By 1978, Canadian trial courts and courts of appeal were,
3 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. 5-26, § 40(1) (1985) (Can.).
4 There is a major difference between Canada and certain jurisdictions in the
United States in claims where a death has occurred. Most death statutes in Can-
ada do not provide for any damages other than pecuniary loss, except for some
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for the first time, awarding plaintiffs damages of more than $1
million (Can.) for personal injuries.5 In 1978, the Supreme
Court of Canada heard three cases, emanating from three prov-
inces, all of which involved catastrophic personal injury, in or-
der to "establish the correct principles of law applicable in
assessing damages in the context of traumatic cases."6 These
three cases, Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd.;7 Arnold v. Teno;a
and Thornton v. Board of School Trustees,9 have become known as
"the Trilogy," and have since remained the cornerstone for
damage assessment in Canadian courts."0
The injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in these cases were both
severe and permanently debilitating. All three plaintiffs were
youthful at the time of their injuries. None was expected to
make a functional recovery.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that each of the plaintiffs
was entitled to $100,000 (Can.) in non-pecuniary damages for
pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life. The Court
stated that "this should be regarded as an upper limit of non-
pecuniary loss in cases of this nature."'1
The rationale underlying the Court's judgment is found
chiefly in the reasoning of Justice Dickson (unanimously con-
curred with) in Andrews. He reasoned:
Andrews used to be a healthy young man, athletically active and
socially congenial. Now he is a cripple, deprived of many of life's
pleasures and subjected to pain and disability. For this, he is en-
titled to compensation. But the problem here is qualitatively dif-
ferent from that of pecuniary losses. There is no medium of
exchange for happiness. There is no market for expectation of
life. The monetary evaluation of non-pecuniary losses is a philo-
sophical and policy exercise more than a legal or logical one.
The award must be fair and reasonable, fairness being gauged by
earlier decisions, but the award must also of necessity be arbitrary
or conventional. No money can provide true restitution. Money
relatively small out-of-pocket expenses. There are no non-pecuniary damages in
death claims in Canada.
5 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.).
6 Id. at 229.
7 Id.
8 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287 (Can.).
) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267 (Can.).
10 Lee v. Swan, No. CA018438 (B.C.C.A. Feb. 13, 1996); Romanick v. Konrad,
121 D.L.R. 4th 261 (B.C.C.A. 1995); Skinner v. Royal Victoria Hosp., No.
15953186, 1994 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 2638 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. Sept. 14, 1994).
11 Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 265.
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can provide for proper care: this is the reason that I think the
paramount concern of the courts when awarding damages for
personal injuries should be to assure that there will be adequate
future care.12
In these circumstances, the Court addressed three possible
theoretical approaches, posited by an English commentator, to
quantification of non-pecuniary loss. 3 The first was a "concep-
tual" approach, where each faculty was dealt with as a proprie-
tary asset with an objective value. The Court rejected this
approach as "unsubtle." 4 The second was a "personal" ap-
proach, which values the injury in terms of the loss of human
happiness by the particular victim.' 5 The third was a "func-
tional" approach, which accepted the personal premise of the
second, but, instead of attempting to set a value on lost happi-
ness, it attempted to assess the compensation required to pro-
vide the injured person "with reasonable solace for his
misfortune. 16
The Court accepted the "functional" approach, largely upon
the basis that it accepted the fact that what had been lost was
incapable of being replaced in any direct way."7 Having so con-
cluded, the Court wrote, "If damages for non-pecuniary loss are
viewed from a functional perspective, it is reasonable that large
amounts should not be awarded once a person is properly pro-
vided for in terms of future care for his injuries and
disabilities. 18
In these circumstances, the Court held that $100,000 (Can.)
provided a rough upper parameter on these awards, outlining as
well that "the figures must be viewed flexibly in future cases in
recognition of the inevitable differences in injuries, the situa-
tion of the victim, and changing economic conditions."19
In the years that have followed, courts have "slavishly" viewed
the present value of $100,000 (Can.) as a "ceiling" for non-pecu-
niary loss. With inflation, this "ceiling" had risen to $250,280
(Can.), measured in September 1995 dollars. 20 The Trilogy also
12 Id. at 260-61.
13 Id. at 261-62.
14 Id. at 261.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 261-62.
17 Id. at 262.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 263.
20 Muir v. Alberta, [1996] 4 W.W.R. 177 (Alta. Q.B.).
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sets a standard against which less catastrophic injuries can be
measured.
While the Supreme Court of Canada left the door open for
awards exceeding the "ceiling" in the proper case, we have been
unable to find any cases in recent years in which this has oc-
curred. This is not surprising, given Justice Dickson's comment
in Andrews that "[i] t is difficult to conceive of a person of his age
losing more than Andrews has lost."'"
Interestingly, these cases of catastrophic injuries are one of
the rare occasions in Canada where the trial judge can direct a
jury on the amount of damages that would be appropriate to
award.
B. UNITED STATES APPROACH
While the authors are not as familiar with American jurispru-
dence on damages as they are with Canadian case law, a brief
review of the authorities makes clear that:
a. United States courts will, in appropriate circumstances,
award much higher damages for non-pecuniary loss than will
their counterparts in Canada;22 and
b. There are no judicially imposed "caps" upon non-pecuniary
loss in the United States.
In Consorti v. Armstrong World Industries, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed non-pecuni-
ary loss in the context of asbestos-related injury.23
The plaintiff, John Consorti, worked from 1960 to 1992 for
various family-owned insulation businesses. While working in
these businesses (at least through the mid-1970s), Consorti was
exposed to asbestos products, including some produced by the
defendant, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. In 1991,
Mr. Consorti began to suffer from back problems. In February
1992, he was diagnosed with pluvial mesothelioma, a terminal
form of cancer of the lining of the lung. The trial of this matter
was brought in June 1993 as a result of fears that Mr. Consorti
had only months to live. On July 22, 1993, a jury returned a
verdict of over $13 million (U.S.), including $8 million (U.S.)
for past pain and suffering and $4 million (U.S.) for future pain
and suffering. 24
21 Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 263.
22 Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72 F.3d 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1005-06.
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The court of appeals set aside the $12 million (U.S.) award
for pain and suffering, ordering a new trial unless the plaintiff
agreed to accept an award of $3.5 million (U.S.).25 In reducing
the award for non-pecuniary loss, the court attempted to bring
the non-pecuniary damages in line with a series of recent awards
made to other suffers of mesotheloma. 26 Even with the reduc-
tion, the award is approximately fourteen times the maximum
amount that a similar plaintiff could have been awarded in
Canada.
It is interesting, however, to note that the court in Consorti,
like the Supreme Court of Canada in the Trilogy, recognized
the subjective nature of awards for non-pecuniary loss. It held:
While the law seeks by reasonable compensation to make a plain-
tiff whole, we must recognize that compensation for suffering
can be accomplished only in a symbolic and arbitrary fashion.
There are at least two serious shortcomings to the endeavor.
First, money awards do not make one whole; they do not alleviate
pain. Second, there is no rational scale that justifies the award of
any particular amount, as opposed to some very different
amount, in compensation for a particular quantum of pain.27
The court in Consorti recognized that "measuring pain and suf-
fering in dollars is inescapably subjective. 28
United States courts appear to be applying a "personal" ap-
proach to non-pecuniary quantification, as opposed to the
"functional" approach mandated in Canada. Rather than pro-
viding a sum for "solace," made in conjunction with a pecuniary
award, United States courts appear to be striving to compensate
individuals for pain and suffering. This provides some explana-
tion as to why such an astronomical difference exists between
non-pecuniary awards in Canada and the United States.
Although it is clear that there is significant U.S. appellate
scrutiny over jury awards for non-pecuniary loss, it appears un-
likely, in the absence of legislative intervention, that the chasm
between non-pecuniary damages in Canada and those in the
United States will narrow significantly. There is no indication
that, at least in Canada, a philosophical change in this regard is
imminent.
25 Id. at 1015-16.
26 Id. at 1009.
27 Id. (quoting Gibbs v. United States, 599 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1979)).
28 Id. at 1014.
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II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
Punitive damages may be appropriate to punish the wrong-
doer, to prevent the wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, or to set
an example that will deter others. The type of conduct required
involves wrongful acts that were outrageous or reprehensible
and offensive to ordinary standards of decent conduct in the
community. This includes conduct which is malicious, vindic-
tive, harsh, or which indicates a contempt for the plaintiffs
rights.
Canadian courts have generally shown great reluctance in
awarding punitive damages. Indeed, punitive damages, in the
context of products liability actions, are very much the excep-
tion as opposed to the rule.
The Supreme Court of Canada recently visited the issue of
punitive damages in Vorvis v. Insurance Corp.29 The plaintiff was
a solicitor in the defendant's legal department who was dis-
missed for alleged incompetence after approximately seven and
one-half years of employment. In the action for wrongful dis-
missal, the plaintiff included a claim for punitive damages.30
One issue to be addressed was whether punitive damages were
available at all for breach of contract.
The Court found that while it may be very unusual to do so,
punitive damages may be awarded in cases of breach of contract,
although it held that Mr. Vorvis was not, on the facts, so enti-
tled. 1 The Court made clear that, regardless of whether a case
is founded in tort or contract, an award of punitive damages
"should always receive the most careful consideration and the
discretion to award them should be most cautiously exercised. '32
The Court held as follows with respect to the availability of
punitive damages:
When then can punitive damages be awarded? It must never be
forgotten that when awarded by a judge or a jury, a punishment
is imposed upon a person by a Court by the operation of the
judicial process. What is it that is punished? It surely cannot be
merely conduct of which the Court disapproves, however
29 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.).
30 Id. at 1090.
31 Id. at 1107.
32 Id. at 1104-05.
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strongly the judge may feel. Punishment may not be imposed in
a civilized community without a justification in law."3
It further adopted the following (which had found approval
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS): "Punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the con-
duct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive
damages are recoverable. ' 34 Finally, the Court added: "More-
over, punitive damages may only be awarded in respect of con-
duct which is of such nature as to be deserving of punishment
because of its harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and malicious
nature.
'3 5
In fact, in Canada, punitive sanctions are, to a large extent,
left to the government to implement and prosecute. As is ap-
parent from both this and the previous section relating to non-
pecuniary damages, Canadian courts are generally willing to
award damages to a plaintiff for objectively calculable losses and
little more. Canadian judicial philosophy appears to reflect a
belief that the spectrum of compensating damages is itself usu-
ally sufficient to achieve a general deterrence against ongoing
wrongful behavior.
B. UNITED STATES APPROACH
Once again, the authors are not as intimately aware of United
States jurisprudence on punitive damages as they are of Cana-
dian law on the issue. It is clear to the authors, however, that
courts in the United States believe that they have the latitude to
award punitive damages in far more cases than their Canadian
counterparts.3 6 Reflecting this sentiment is the fact that a
number of states have felt it necessary to pass legislation either:
a. Placing caps on awards of punitive damages;
b. Providing for payment of sums to state agencies rather than
to plaintiffs; and/or
c. Mandating bifurcated trials with separate proceedings for
punitive damages determinations.37
Because punitive damage awards are so rare in Canada, no such
legislation has been necessary. Canadians view with amazement
cases such as the recent decision of the United States Supreme
33 Id. at 1105-06.
34 Id. at 1106 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981)).
35 Id. at 1107-08.
36 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
37 Id. at 1618 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.8 Dr. Gore
purchased a new BMW automobile from a dealer in Birming-
ham, Alabama. After driving the car for approximately nine
months, Dr. Gore took the vehicle to an independent detailer to
make it look "snazzier than it would normally appear."39 The
detailer detected evidence that the vehicle had been repainted.
Dr. Gore had not had any paint work done.
BMW had indeed repainted portions of the vehicle at its vehi-
cle preparation center in Georgia. At trial, BMW acknowledged
a nationwide policy (adopted in 1983): If the cost of repairing
damage to vehicles prior to sale did not exceed three percent of
the suggested retail price, the repair was made and the vehicle
sold as new without advising the dealer that repairs had been
made.41 This accorded with legislation in several states.
At trial, Dr. Gore presented evidence that the practice of
BMW devalued his vehicle by approximately ten percent, or
$4000 (U.S.). To support his claim for punitive damages, evi-
dence was introduced that BMW had, since 1983, sold 983 refin-
ished cars as new, including fourteen in Alabama. Using the
actual damage estimate of $4000 per vehicle, Dr. Gore sought $4
million (U.S.) in punitive damages.42 The jury awarded Dr.
Gore $4000 (U.S.) in compensatory damages, and $6 million
(U.S.) in punitive damages against BMW. BMW appealed.
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled in favor of BMW on a crit-
ical point. The court found that the jury improperly computed
the amount of punitive damages by multiplying Dr. Gore's com-
pensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other juris-
dictions. It reduced the award of punitive damages to $2
million (U.S.). BMW appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.4 4
The United States Supreme Court held, by a 5-to-4 margin,
that the $2 million (U.S.) award of punitive damages, being 500
times greater than the actual harm, "raise (d) a suspicious judi-
cial eyebrow. '45 The award was held to be grossly excessive, ex-
38 Id. at 1589.




43 Id. at 1593-94.
- Id. at 1594.
45 Id. at 1603 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 482 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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ceeding the constitutional limit, and was remanded back to the
state of Alabama for future proceedings.46
American philosophy in relation to punitive damages is clear
from this judgment, and the decisions referred to therein. Puni-
tive damages may be imposed to further a state's legitimate in-
terests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition.47 These interests reflect scepticism on the part of
United States courts (which is not apparent in Canada) that the
payment of compensatory damages alone is not a sufficient de-
terrent to unlawful conduct. In addition, plaintiffs are given,
through the mechanism of punitive damages, latitude to person-
ally attempt to generally deter such conduct-the potential "re-
ward" for which would be receipt of a sum of money that could
conceivably exceed compensatory damages.
To Canadians, punitive damages in the millions of dollars are
absolutely unknown. In addition, it is highly unlikely that a case
such as BMW would attract a plea for punitive damages, let
alone win an award for damages at a trial.
In the authors' opinion, the case would have proceeded in a
very different manner had it been commenced in the province
of British Columbia in Canada. That province has a small claims
court limit of $10,000 (Can.). It is likely, given the fact that the
plaintiff's evidence established compensatory damages of $4000
(Can.), that the claim would have been commenced in small
claims court. No costs are awarded in that court, so it is quite
likely that the plaintiff would have represented himself before
the court. The case would have been heard by a single judge,
and the trial would likely have taken no more than a half a day.
An award of $4000 (Can.) plus interest would, in all
probability, have been made. There would have been a right of
appeal to the British Columbia Supreme Court, but, given the
quantum involved, it is unlikely that such an appeal would have
been launched.
In Canada, there is no movement afoot to expand the availa-
bility of punitive damages. In the United States, as noted byJus-
tice Scalia in a dissenting opinion in BMW, there does appear to
be some "concern about punitive damages that 'run wild."' 48
This concern has manifested itself to the extent that, to use the
46 Id. at 1591.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1610 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18
(1991)).
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words ofJustice Scalia, "the measure of civil punishment poses a
question of constitutional dimension to be answered by this
Court. '49 Similarly, legislatures in the United States have seen
fit to attempt to limit punitive damages.5
Although the two countries appear to be moving somewhat
closer in relation to punitive damages, the gap is still a large
one. This gap is so significant that it will probably take dramatic
legislation in the United States to completely bridge the gap.
We have no reason to believe that this is likely to occur in the
near future.
III. CONCLUSION
Access to jury trials and philosophical differences between Ca-
nadian and American courts relating to quantification of non-
pecuniary damages, and availability of punitive damages will
continue to drive jurisdictional disputes between plaintiffs and
defendants involved in some aviation accidents. There is no evi-
dence that these differences will soon be resolved.
Courts in both Canada and the United States speak of the
necessity for certainty and predictability in relation to damages
to allow potential litigants to reasonably assess the cost of doing
business. The differences in approach between the two coun-
tries, however, serve to undermine this certainty. Canadian
companies, in particular, may, in conjunction with accidents
which occur in Canada, face lawsuits in foreign jurisdictions,
claiming damages especially higher than they may ever have ex-
pected. This being the case, it is not surprising that parties fight
vigorously to have actions tried in the forum of their choice.
4, Id. at 1611.
50 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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